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MARKET EFFECTS BEARING ON FAIR USE 
Jeanne C. Fromer* 
Abstract: Copyright law, which promotes the creation of cultural and artistic works by 
protecting these works from being copied, excuses infringement that is deemed to be a fair 
use. Whether an otherwise infringing work is a fair use is determined by courts weighing at 
least four factors, one of which is the effect of the otherwise infringing work on the market 
for the copyrighted work. The Supreme Court’s decision just over twenty years ago in 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. opened the door to a laudable analytical framework for 
the bearing of market effects on fair use. First, Campbell supports a more full-bodied 
investigation of the market effects—both harms and benefits—of defendants’ works on 
plaintiffs’ copyrighted works. Courts can eliminate conclusory reasoning by appreciating that 
both market harms and benefits can matter in assessing fair use. In so doing, courts avoid 
weighing only the mere possibility that a licensing market does or could exist for a 
copyrighted work as a reflection of market harm and ignoring the possibility that a use of a 
copyrighted work might confer benefits on the copyright holder. Second, Campbell implied 
two important ways to divide relevant from irrelevant market effects. One ought to exclude 
market effects from consideration if they are empirically unlikely or if there are effects 
unrelated to the protectable aspects of the copyrighted work, such as its ideas or the societal 
value attributed to the work. This analytical framework for market effects bearing on fair use 
advances copyright’s goal of promoting the creation of artistic and cultural works from 
which society can benefit. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Copyright law, which promotes the creation of cultural and artistic 
works by protecting these works from being copied, excuses 
infringement that is deemed to be a fair use.1 A fair use of a copyrighted 
work is generally one that would promote the general advancement of 
art and culture, even if it falls within the scope of a third party’s 
copyright protection. A court determines whether an otherwise 
infringing work is a fair use by weighing at least four factors, one of 
which is the effect of the otherwise infringing work on the market for the 
copyrighted work.2 Many scholars have long been troubled by courts’ 
conclusory, or circular, analyses of this factor.3 A prominent treatise on 
fair use calls this factor “[t]he least understood, and, as a consequence, 
most misapplied.”4 Sometimes, courts will summarily conclude that a 
copyright owner is harmed by the infringer’s failure to license the 
copyrighted work, which, on its own, counts against any alleged 
infringement being a fair use.5 Other times, courts will just as abruptly 
exclude certain market effects, such as markets for criticism,6 from their 
consideration of this fair use factor, thereby deeming these uses to be 
fair with regard to this factor.7 With such short-circuited analyses, courts 
can expand or diminish the scope of what constitutes fair use without the 
penetrating justifications this factor’s examination deserves.8 
1. See infra Part I.A. 
2. Id. 
3. See, e.g., MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05(A)(4), at 
13-199 to 13-206.4 (2014); Pierre N. Leval, Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use Rescued, 44 UCLA L. REV. 
1449, 1465 (1997); Lydia P. Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era 
of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 38–39 (1997); Frank Pasquale, Breaking 
the Vicious Circularity: Sony’s Contribution to the Fair Use Doctrine, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
777, 781–84 (2005). 
4. WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON FAIR USE § 6:1, at 536 (2014 ed.); cf. Barton Beebe, An 
Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 617 
(2008) (“The fourth factor essentially constitutes a metafactor under which courts integrate their 
analyses of the other three factors and, in doing so, arrive at the outcome not simply of the fourth 
factor, but of the overall test.”). 
5. See infra Part II. 
6. A market for criticism is simply any conceivable use of a copyrighted work to criticize or 
comment on it. See infra Part III.B. 
7. See infra Part III. 
8. See, e.g., James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 
YALE L.J. 882, 887 (2007) (“[C]opyright users . . . seek licenses even when they have a good fair 
use claim—i.e., even when proceeding unlicensed would probably result in no liability. This 
practice of unneeded licensing feeds back into doctrine because of one final uncontroversial 
premise: the fair use defense looks to the existence vel non of a licensing market when defining the 
reach of the copyright entitlement. The result is a steady, incremental, and unintended expansion of 
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In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,9 the Supreme Court issued a 
foundational ruling on the contours of the fair use doctrine when it held 
that transformative works, such as parodies, will frequently be fair uses 
and thus immune from classification as copyright infringement.10 In 
applying the law’s four-factor fair use analysis, the Court emphasized 
that transformative works are important contributions to society unless 
they cause relevant harm to the copyright owner’s market (from which 
the Court excluded a market for criticism).11 
I argue that the Campbell decision opened the door to a laudable 
analytical framework for the bearing of market effects on fair use. 
However, the Court obfuscated this framework by not underscoring its 
reasoning for this fair use factor, which has meant that many—though 
not all—courts continue to offer malnourished or unreasonable analyses 
of this factor. 
This Article seeks to excavate Campbell’s skeletal framework and to 
add analytical flesh and heft to it. Campbell can be read to improve 
consideration of market effects bearing on fair use in two ways. First, 
Campbell supports a more full-bodied investigation of the market 
effects—both harms and benefits—of defendants’ works on plaintiffs’ 
copyrighted works.12 One can infer as much from a combination of 
Campbell’s analytical steps: placing a strong emphasis on the value of 
transformative works, differentiating different sorts of market effects, 
and recognizing the strong connections between a copyrighted work and 
a transformative work making use of it. Implicit in this reasoning is the 
possibility that works that transform existing material can draw attention 
to, enhance, or affirm the original work’s role in the marketplace. 
Approximately twenty years after Campbell, some courts have begun 
to recognize that market benefits ought to count in favor of finding that a 
defendant’s use is fair.13 The recent fair use decision in the Southern 
District of New York on Google Book Search is one such example.14 
Similarly, copyright holders—including those that have been litigiously 
copyright, caused by nothing more than ambiguous doctrine and prudent behavior on the part of 
copyright users.”). 
9. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
10. See infra Part I.C. 
11. Id. 
12. See infra Part II. 
13. Id. 
14. See Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (reasoning that 
Google Book Search’s service can drive book sales and increased attention to long-forgotten 
books). 
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protective of their copyrighted material in the past, such as Disney15—
are increasingly acting in ways that suggest they realize that certain 
unauthorized third-party uses of their copyrighted works can redound to 
their financial benefit. For instance, Disney has opted not to rein in those 
who have covered, parodied, or built on the songs, characters, and other 
material from its hit movie Frozen.16 
A court’s appreciation that market harms and benefits can both matter 
in assessing fair use helps eliminate conclusory reasoning. Some courts 
weigh against fair use the mere possibility that a licensing market does 
or could exist for a copyrighted work, as this possibility reflects market 
harm.17 Others have been skeptical that a glimmer or even the full-
fledged development of a licensing market is enough to damn a 
defendant’s use, as either can be asserted for just about any category of 
work that a defendant might reasonably seek to classify as a fair use.18 
To break out of the analytical circularity of weighing against fair use 
the possibility that the defendant’s use could have been licensed, courts 
should focus on market benefit alongside market harm in assessing fair 
use. A full-bodied assessment of the effect of a defendant’s use on a 
work—not merely its harmful effects—gets courts to look at all effects 
once they surpass a specified degree of speculativeness, be they 
licensing harms or sales benefits. 
There is a second way in which Campbell ought to be read to solve 
fair use’s circularity problem. Specifically, Campbell recognizes 
generally that certain market effects ought to be weighed in the fair use 
analysis, while others are irrelevant. The Campbell decision does not 
articulate the reason for excluding markets for criticism from the 
analysis of the harm to its market a copyright owner might suffer. 
Nonetheless, Campbell implied two important ways to divide relevant 
from irrelevant market effects. One ought to exclude market effects from 
consideration if they are empirically unlikely or if the effects are 
unrelated to the protectable aspects of the copyrighted work, such as its 
ideas or the societal value attributed to the work.19 By providing a rule 
15. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978) (involving a lawsuit 
by Disney for copyright infringement against a comic book maker that placed the Disney characters 
in lewd situations). 
16. Andrew Leonard, How Disney Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Copyright Infringement, 
SALON (May 23, 2014, 9:43 AM), http://www.salon.com/2014/05/23/how_disney_learned_to_stop_ 
worrying_and_love_copyright_infringement. 
17. See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). 
18. See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006). 
19. See infra Part III. 
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for which market effects to consider, fair use inquiries can be made 
analytically sturdy. 
Part I sets out how Campbell opened the door—even if only 
obliquely—to consideration of a full-bodied set of market effects 
(market benefits alongside market harms) but only potential and 
copyright-relevant market effects. Part II sets out the case for 
considering both market harm and benefit together in light of the 
relevant law and scholarship, and shows how this consideration solves a 
lingering problem of conclusory reasoning and circularity in the fair use 
determination. Part III advocates for courts to consider only those 
market effects that are truly potential and copyright-relevant in assessing 
fair use to solve another persistent analytical deficiency in the fair use 
determination. Taken together, this framework for assessing market 
effects bearing on fair use is robust and helps promote copyright law’s 
goal of promoting the creation and dissemination of artistic and cultural 
works. 
I. FAIR USE THROUGH CAMPBELL 
American copyright law exists to promote the production and 
dissemination of valuable creative works. The fair use defense to 
copyright infringement serves this overarching goal. This Part provides 
an overview of copyright law and policy and then turns to how the 
Supreme Court has treated fair use, culminating in its decision in 
Campbell. 
A. Copyright Law 
American copyright law protects “original works of authorship fixed 
in any tangible medium of expression,” including literary works, sound 
recordings, movies, and computer software code.20 A copyright holder 
receives, among other things, the exclusive right to reproduce the work, 
distribute copies of it, and prepare derivative works21 typically until 
seventy years after the author’s death.22 Copyright protection extends to 
the expression of particular ideas rather than to the ideas themselves.23 
Yet protection actually reaches well beyond the literal work to works 
20. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 
1249 (3d Cir. 1983) (clarifying that computer software code is a literary work under copyright law). 
21. 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
22. Id. § 302(a). 
23. See id. § 102(b); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
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that are copied and substantially similar,24 “else a plagiarist would 
escape by immaterial variations.”25 
Utilitarianism, or instrumentalism, is the dominant purpose of 
American copyright law.26 According to utilitarian theory, copyright law 
provides the incentive of exclusive rights for a limited duration to 
authors to motivate them to create culturally valuable works.27 Without 
this incentive, the theory goes, authors might not invest the time, energy, 
and money necessary to create these works because they might be 
copied cheaply and easily by free-riders, eliminating authors’ ability to 
profit from their works.28 
Utilitarianism aligns fluently with (and is frequently justified by) the 
U.S. Constitution’s grant of power to Congress “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.”29 Pursuant to utilitarianism, the rights conferred by 
copyright laws are designed to be limited in time and scope.30 The 
reason for providing copyright protection to creators is to encourage 
them to produce socially valuable works, thereby maximizing social 
welfare.31 If the provided rights are exceedingly extensive, society 
would be hurt (and social welfare diminished).32 For one thing, 
exclusive rights in intellectual property can prevent competition in 
24. Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1253 (11th Cir. 2007); Whitehead v. Paramount 
Pictures Corp., 53 F. Supp. 2d 38, 45–46 (D.D.C. 1999). 
25. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121. 
26. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“By 
establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic 
incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and 
Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1576–77 (2009); William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989). 
27. Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1197 
(1996) (“[C]opyright provides an incentive for authors to create and disseminate works of social 
value.”). 
28. See Alina Ng, The Author’s Rights in Literary and Artistic Works, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 453, 453 (2009); Sterk, supra note 27, at 1197; Symposium, The Constitutionality 
of Copyright Term Extension: How Long Is Too Long?, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 676 
(2000) (statement of Wendy Gordon). 
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, An Information Theory of 
Copyright Law, 64 EMORY L.J. 71 (2014) (exploring, through the lens of information theory, the 
sort of progress that copyright law does and ought to encourage). 
30. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. 
REV. 989, 997 (1997). 
31. Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled Standards, 70 
MINN. L. REV. 579, 592–96 (1985). 
32. Lemley, supra note 30, at 996–97. 
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protected works, thereby allowing the rights-holder to charge a premium 
for access and ultimately limiting these valuable works’ diffusion to 
society at large.33 For another, given that knowledge is frequently 
cumulative, society benefits when subsequent creators are not prevented 
from building on previous artistic creations to generate new works.34 For 
these reasons, copyright law ensures both that the works it protects fall 
into the public domain in due course and that third parties are free to use 
protected works for certain socially valuable purposes.35 At bottom, a 
utilitarian theory of copyright law rests on the premise that the benefit to 
society of creators crafting valuable works offsets the costs to society of 
the incentives the law offers to creators.36 
In furtherance of its overarching utilitarian goals, copyright law 
excuses some third-party uses that would otherwise be infringing by 
deeming them to be fair use.37 Recognizing that most creative works in 
some way build on and borrow from pre-existing works,38 a “fair use” 
carve-out has numerous instrumental justifications. Most relevantly, the 
fair use doctrine can stimulate the production of creative works for 
public consumption without undercutting the value of the original 
copyrighted work too much.39 It does so by enabling third parties to 
create culturally valuable works that must borrow from the original work 
in some capacity in order to succeed, often transforming it.40 As 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 997–98. 
35. Id. at 999. 
36. Id. at 996–97. Despite the dominance of utilitarian thinking in American copyright law, 
scholars also proffer other theories to justify copyright protection. These theories are typically 
grounded in the notion of natural or moral rights that authors and inventors deserve by virtue of 
having created their works. See, e.g., Balganesh, supra note 26, at 1576–77; Brown, supra note 31, 
at 589–90. Moral-rights theories typically come in two flavors: labor-desert and personhood. For 
more on the labor-desert theory, see ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
31–67 (2011); Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
609 (1993); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in 
the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540–83 (1993); Justin Hughes, The 
Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 296–330 (1988). For more on personhood 
theory, see Hughes, supra, at 330–65; Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. 
REV. 957 (1982). I argue in a prior work that these theories can form the basis of expressive 
incentives for creators in a utilitarian system. Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in 
Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745 (2012). 
37. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
38. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575–76 (1994). 
39. See id. at 577 (noting that the fair use doctrine allows courts to avoid rigid application of 
copyright law which might stifle the creativity the law seeks to foster). 
40. See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111–16 
(1990).  
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suggested by statutory directives on fair use41 and elaborated in case 
law, some prototypical examples include news reporting, critical 
reviews, and parodies.42 A second, partially related argument set forth by 
Wendy Gordon is that “fair use [ought] to permit uncompensated 
transfers that are socially desirable but not capable of effectuation 
through the market.”43 Examples include parodies that might cast an 
unfavorable light on an original work or uses for which the transaction 
costs are too great for the copyright owner to agree to a licensing 
arrangement.44 
Ushered into the common law in 1841 by Justice Story,45 the fair use 
defense has been statutorily codified since 1976.46 A set of 
(nonexclusive) statutory factors must be analyzed to determine whether 
a particular use is fair: “the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes,” “the nature of the copyrighted work,” “the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole,” and “the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”47 The copyright 
statute illustrates some such instances: “criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), 
scholarship, or research.”48 
As congressional reports emphasized, the codification of the fair use 
defense 
endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine 
of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in 
41. See infra text accompanying note 48. 
42. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578–85 (parodies); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985) (news reporting); Sundeman v. Seajay Soc’y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194, 
206 (4th Cir. 1998) (critical review). 
43. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the 
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1601 (1982). A third argument—less 
relevant here—is grounded in technology, such as allowing the intermediate copying of copyrighted 
software code to make a program that is interoperable with a preexisting computer or gaming 
system. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1513–14 (9th Cir. 1992). 
44. See Gordon, supra note 43, at 1633. 
45. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). Justice Story articulated fair 
use factors that have evolved into those currently encoded in statute: “the nature and objects of the 
selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may 
prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.” Id. at 348. 
46. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); see William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: 
Profit, Presumptions, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 669 (1993). 
47. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)–(4). 
48. Id. § 107.  
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the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological 
change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair 
use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be 
free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-
case basis.49 
In sum, copyright law’s fair use defense aligns with its overarching 
utilitarian goals of encouraging the creation, distribution, and 
consumption of artistic and cultural works. It excuses third-party uses of 
copyrighted works that promote these aims and would otherwise 
constitute copyright infringement. 
B. Market Effects in Fair Use Pre-Campbell 
Since Justice Story’s institution of the fair use defense, courts have 
been considering the question of precisely which market effects on the 
original copyrighted work or protected derivative works ought to qualify 
in evaluating whether to excuse what would otherwise be copyright 
infringement as a fair use.50 One query is how broadly to define the 
copyright market (and potential markets), another is which effects on 
these markets ought to matter, and yet another is how concrete the 
effects ought to be before they are considered.51 This Section reviews 
judicial evaluations of market effects bearing on fair use leading up to 
Campbell. 
The Supreme Court’s decisions leading up to Campbell invoke some 
of these complicated issues, but only rudimentarily. In a copyright 
infringement case against manufacturers of home video recorders, Sony 
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,52 the Court held that the 
general television-viewing public’s recording on videocassette recorders 
of copyrighted broadcast television programs for later viewing 
constituted fair use.53 
Although the Court never stated as much outright, Sony might be read 
as hinting that market benefits to copyright holders ought to be evaluated 
in assessing market effects for fair use. With regard to the fourth 
factor—market effects—the Court explained the basic framework for 
evaluation: “[A] use that has no demonstrable effect upon the potential 
49. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976); see also S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62 (1975). 
50. Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 46, at 687–89. 
51. See id. (raising queries of how the potential market should be defined, the type of harm that 
should be considered, and how burdens of proof and production should be allocated). 
52. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
53. Id. at 454. 
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market for, or the value of, the copyrighted work need not be prohibited 
in order to protect the author’s incentive to create.”54 The Court asserted 
that relevant market effects need not constitute “[a]ctual present harm,” 
but merely “some meaningful likelihood of future harm.”55 
The Court did not say much more about analyzing the market effects 
for fair use of viewers’ so-called “time shifting” of its programs 
(recording broadcast programs to watch at a later time). It characterized 
most of the copyright holders’ evidence of market effects of time 
shifting—with regard to whether viewers would now fast-forward 
through advertising, from which producers derived income, and whether 
time shifting would decrease the amount of television viewership—as 
speculative.56 Yet the Court insinuated—without relying on this 
intimation for its legal ruling—that in addition to the harms that the 
copyright owners might suffer, they might also benefit from viewers’ 
time shifting. First, the Court observed that “the findings of the District 
Court make it clear that time-shifting may enlarge the total viewing 
audience” for a work.57 The Court elaborated, in discussing copyright 
owners that authorize time shifting, that “[i]n the context of television 
programming, some producers evidently believe that permitting home 
viewers to make copies of their works off the air actually enhances the 
value of their copyrights.”58 The Court also alluded to a potential market 
in “pre-recorded videotapes,” but did not factor that possibility into its 
analysis of market effects.59 Finally, the Court highlighted the district 
court’s finding that “[i]t is not implausible that benefits could also 
accrue to plaintiffs, broadcasters, and advertisers, as the [video recorder] 
makes it possible for more persons to view their broadcasts.”60 
Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Sony seemed to confirm that the Sony 
majority was hinting at the relevance of market benefits to copyright 
holders, because his dissent sought to refute such a rule: 
[A]n infringer cannot prevail merely by demonstrating that the 
copyright holder suffered no net harm from the infringer’s 
action. Indeed, even a showing that the infringement has 
54. Id. at 450. 
55. Id. at 451 (emphasis in original). 
56. Id. at 451–54. 
57. Id. at 443. 
58. Id. at 446 n.28. 
59. Id. at 450 n.33. It is unclear whether the Court did not factor in this possible market because it 
was too speculative or because viewers’ time shifting was noncommercial, something on which it 
also placed emphasis. Id. at 451–54. 
60. Id. at 454 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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resulted in a net benefit to the copyright holder will not suffice. 
Rather, the infringer must demonstrate that he had not impaired 
the copyright holder’s ability to demand compensation from (or 
to deny access to) any group who would otherwise be willing to 
pay to see or hear the copyrighted work.61 
All in all, the Sony Court did not issue anything close to a definitive 
framework on market effects bearing on fair use. There was some 
discussion that the copyright owners might suffer or benefit in different 
ways from the time shifting, and there was some mention of potential—
but not yet actual—markets in pre-recorded videotapes. But there was 
little guidance to future courts as to assessing market effects bearing on 
fair use. 
Less than one year later, the Supreme Court decided another 
blockbuster fair use case in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enterprises.62 In that case, the Court decided that there was no fair use 
for a magazine pre-publishing critical aspects of President Gerald Ford’s 
memoirs explaining Ford’s pardon of Richard Nixon.63 In coming to its 
decision, the Court discussed the market effects factor. In this case, there 
was direct evidence of an actual harm to the copyright owner’s market as 
a result of the defendant’s pre-publication. As the Court observed, the 
copyright owner was harmed by another magazine’s “cancellation of its 
projected serialization [of the memoir] and its refusal to 
pay . . . $12,500.”64 The Court thus saw this harm as overwhelming and 
found little need to evaluate any potential effects, other than to 
emphasize that were it to condone the challenged use, such uses could 
become widespread and also cause market harms in the future.65 
In sum, the Supreme Court’s treatment of market effects bearing on 
fair use predating Campbell is tentative and embryonic. 
61. Id. at 485 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
62. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
63. Id. at 542. 
64. Id. at 567. 
65. Id. at 568. In issuing its ruling, the Court noted that “[a]ny copyright infringer may claim to 
benefit the public by increasing public access to the copyrighted work. But Congress has not 
designed, and we see no warrant for judicially imposing, a ‘compulsory license’ permitting 
unfettered access to the unpublished copyrighted expression of public figures.” Id. at 569 (citations 
omitted). The Court seemed to be saying nothing other than an isolated market benefit would not, 
without consideration of other relevant factors, sanction an excusal of copyright infringement. But 
see Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of the Month Club, 13 F. Supp. 2d 782, 789–90 (N.D. Ill. 1998) 
(reading this statement to disallow consideration of market benefits as part of the market effects 
bearing on fair use). 
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C. Campbell’s Treatment of Fair Use 
Campbell followed Sony and Harper & Row. Campbell gave the U.S. 
Supreme Court an opportunity to consider the fair use defense for works 
parodying copyrighted creations. In Campbell, the Court was reviewing 
2 Live Crew’s rap version of Roy Orbison’s song, “Oh, Pretty Woman,” 
which “substitute[s] predictable lyrics with shocking ones that derisively 
demonstrate how bland and banal the Orbison song seems to them.”66 
After working through the four-factor fair use analysis in this context, 
the Court ruled that “the nature of parody” deserves prominent 
consideration weighing in favor of fair use.67 
The Court’s analysis reflected its judgment that the defendant’s 
parodic use permeates each of the four fair use factors. With regard to 
the nature and character of the defendant’s use, the Campbell Court 
looked primarily to “whether the new work merely ‘supersedes the 
objects’ of the original creation or instead adds something new, with a 
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new 
expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to 
what extent the new work is ‘transformative.’”68 The Court reasoned that 
the more transformative the new work, the more likely it would be to be 
a fair use, because creating transformative works fundamentally 
advances copyright’s goals.69 Parody, as per the Court, tends to be 
transformative: “Like less ostensibly humorous forms of criticism, it can 
provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the 
process, creating a new one.”70 To work effectively, a parody must 
“use . . . some elements of a prior author’s composition to create a new 
one that, at least in part, comments on that author’s works.”71 As 
evaluated in the context of 2 Live Crew’s song, Justice Souter, writing 
for the Court, elaborated: 
2 Live Crew juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose 
fantasy comes true, with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for 
sex, and a sigh of relief from paternal responsibility. The later 
words can be taken as a comment on the naiveté of the original 
of an earlier day, as a rejection of its sentiment that ignores the 
66. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582 (1994) (original alternations omitted) 
(quoting Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1155 (M.D. Tenn. 1991)). 
67. Id. at 571–72. 
68. Id. at 579 (citations omitted). 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 580. 
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ugliness of street life and the debasement that it signifies. It is 
this joinder of reference and ridicule that marks off the author’s 
choice of parody from the other types of comment and criticism 
that traditionally have had a claim to fair use protection as 
transformative works.72 
The Court thought that the parodic aspects of 2 Live Crew’s work 
affected the second factor—the nature of the copyrighted work—as well. 
It indicated that though “the Orbison original’s creative expression for 
public dissemination falls within the core of the copyright’s protective 
purposes,” generally weighing against fair use, “[t]his fact . . . is not 
much help in this case, or ever likely to help much in separating the fair 
use sheep from the infringing goats in a parody case, since parodies 
almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive works.”73 
The Court also minimized the significance of the third fair use factor, 
the amount and substantiality of the portion used by the defendant in 
relation to the whole copyrighted work, in cases of parodies. It observed 
that: 
When parody takes aim at a particular original work, the parody 
must be able to “conjure up” at least enough of that original to 
make the object of its critical wit recognizable. What makes for 
this recognition is quotation of the original’s most distinctive or 
memorable features, which the parodist can be sure the audience 
will know.74 
Under the fourth fair use factor—the effect of use on the market for 
the copyrighted work—the Court sought to consider “not only the extent 
of market harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, 
but also ‘whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort 
engaged in by the defendant . . . would result in a substantially adverse 
impact on the potential market’ for the original.”75 It elaborated: 
[W]hen a commercial use amounts to mere duplication of the 
entirety of an original, it clearly “supersedes the objects” of the 
original and serves as a market replacement for it, making it 
likely that cognizable market harm to the original will occur. 
But when, on the contrary, the second use is transformative, 
market substitution is at least less certain, and market harm may 
not be so readily inferred. Indeed, as to parody pure and simple, 
it is more likely that the new work will not affect the market for 
72. Id. at 583. 
73. Id. at 586. 
74. Id. at 588 (original alternations omitted) (citations omitted). 
75. Id. at 590 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
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the original in a way cognizable under this factor, that is, by 
acting as a substitute for it (“superseding its objects”). This is so 
because the parody and the original usually serve different 
market functions.76 
In these statements, the Court underscored that transformative works 
are less likely to cause market harm to a copyright owner than works 
that are copies and therefore substitutes in the marketplace. The Court 
thus linked the degree of transformativeness of the defendant’s work 
with the weight of the fourth fair use factor. 
The Court recognized that there could nonetheless be harms to a 
copyright owner’s work from a scathing parody. Therefore, it continued 
on its analysis, separating out market harms cognizable under copyright 
law and harms that are irrelevant to copyright law: 
We do not, of course, suggest that a parody may not harm the 
market at all, but when a lethal parody, like a scathing theater 
review, kills demand for the original, it does not produce a harm 
cognizable under the Copyright Act. Because “parody may quite 
legitimately aim at garroting the original, destroying it 
commercially as well as artistically,” the role of the courts is to 
distinguish between “biting criticism that merely suppresses 
demand and copyright infringement, which usurps it.”77 
In explicating which harms might bear on copyright infringement and 
fair use, the Court ruled that “there is no protectible derivative market 
for criticism.”78 It reasoned that copyright owners were unlikely to 
develop markets for criticism of their works, and thus there would be no 
actual or potential harm to that market by parodies that do not substitute 
for the copyrighted work but merely criticize it.79 
Finally, in a general discussion of fair use, the Court in a footnote 
intimated that market benefits that accrue to copyright holders might be 
relevant to the fair use analysis: 
Even favorable evidence, without more, is no guarantee of 
fairness. Judge [Pierre] Leval gives the example of the film 
producer’s appropriation of a composer’s previously unknown 
song that turns the song into a commercial success; the boon to 
the song does not make the film’s simple copying fair. This 
factor, no less than the other three, may be addressed only 
76. Id. at 591 (original alterations omitted) (citations omitted) (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)). 
77. Id. at 591–92 (original alterations omitted) (citations omitted). 
78. Id. at 592. 
79. Id. at 592–93. 
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through a “sensitive balancing of interests.” Market harm is a 
matter of degree, and the importance of this factor will vary, not 
only with the amount of harm, but also with the relative strength 
of the showing on the other factors.80 
All in all, the Court concludes that some parodies might serve as a 
market substitute for the original copyrighted work, but most would not 
because of their transformativeness. Moreover, the Court hints that some 
parodies might even confer market benefits. 
As dissected in greater detail in Parts II and III, the Campbell Court’s 
analytical moves in its explication of the fourth factor opened the door, 
if only obliquely, to a defensible and robust examination of market 
effects bearing on fair use. This examination is one that accounts for a 
full-bodied sense of market effects—both market harms and benefits—
beyond a specified degree of speculativeness and that are related to 
protected aspects of a copyrighted work. I now turn to building up that 
analytical framework. 
II.  CONSIDERING BOTH MARKET HARMS AND BENEFITS 
The Campbell opinion did little with the notion of market benefits, 
other than to mention it in a footnote. Nonetheless, I argue that the 
opinion’s overarching analysis, with its focus on how a transformative 
work affects the fair use examination, implied that market benefits ought 
to be considered as relevant market effects alongside market harms. 
Furthermore, an examination of market benefits and harms together, so 
long as they surpass a specified degree of speculativeness, solves a 
longstanding problem in fair use analysis. This full-bodied examination 
solves the problem of a circular and conclusory invocation of loss of 
licensing markets whenever a defendant invokes the fair use defense. 
Consider first how Campbell’s analysis suggests that market harms 
and benefits ought to be considered together in evaluating market effects 
bearing on fair use. The Campbell Court places a heavy emphasis on the 
positive value contributed by transformative works when they borrow 
from a copyrighted work to comment on it in some way.81 The Court 
also states that transformative works, like the parodies considered there, 
are unlikely to cause relevant market harm to a copyright owner, even if 
they can harm the market for the copyrighted work in unrelated ways.82 
The clear implication is that because transformative works take from the 
80. Id. at 590 n.21 (citations omitted) (citing Leval, supra note 40, at 1124 n.84). 
81. See supra text accompanying notes 67–76. 
82. See supra text accompanying notes 75–77. 
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copyrighted work, they can have some impact on the market for the 
copyrighted work (be that impact relevant or irrelevant to fair use). As 
the Court’s analysis of the third factor—the amount and substantiality of 
the copyrighted work that is borrowed—indicates, transformative works 
typically need to call to mind the copyrighted work to be effective.83 
Taken together with the Court’s footnote implying that market benefits 
are part and parcel of the evaluation of market effects bearing on fair 
use,84 these assertions suggest that works that transform existing 
material also are directly connected to the existing material, and as such, 
can draw attention to, enhance, or affirm the work’s role in the 
marketplace.85 
While Sony pointed out that market benefits might accrue to copyright 
holders from defendants’ unauthorized uses,86 it is only Campbell’s 
more sustained legal and policy analysis of the values and effects of 
transformative works that suggests a range of potential market benefits 
that copyright holders might generally experience from a third party’s 
use of copyrighted material.87 As Campbell’s analysis linking 
transformative works to the copyrighted works on which they are based 
implies, transformative works borrowing from a copyrighted work can 
readily call attention to the copyrighted work in ways that enhance it in 
the marketplace88: by influencing those exposed to the transformative 
work to buy the copyrighted work, by underscoring the value in the 
copyrighted work, or by whetting consumers’ appetite for other 
derivative works.89 Transformative works that can cause market benefits 
to the copyright holder may take many forms: for example, parodies 
commenting on an existing copyrighted work, reviews of the work, news 
items discussing the work, search engines containing the work, and 
83. See supra text accompanying note 74. 
84. See supra text accompanying note 80. 
85. Cf. Fromer, supra note 29, at 113–17 (explaining through the lens of information theory why 
fair use ought to “sometimes allow for the reuse of key (or unimportant) pieces of knowledge 
encoded in others’ copyrighted works”). 
86. See supra text accompanying notes 52–60. 
87. But cf. Pasquale, supra note 3, at 781 (holding out Sony’s “elevation of a careful and detailed 
district court record finding no demonstrated negative effect on sales for the work” as a beacon for 
courts “to examine the full range of economic effects flowing from a given use”). 
88. But cf. David Fagundes, Market Harm, Market Help, and Fair Use, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 
359, 365 (2014) (“The Court did not, as it could reasonably have, contemplate the possibility that 
Campbell’s recasting ‘Oh Pretty Woman’ in a modern medium may have reignited interest in the 
original work, boosting demand for record sales and for other licensing opportunities.”). 
89. Cf. id. at 378–85 (listing ways in which unauthorized uses can benefit the market for 
copyrighted works, by offering the works greater recognition, affirmation, or access). 
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devices allowing access to copyrighted works.90 
An emphasis on both the market harms and benefits that a defendant’s 
use makes for a copyrighted work is consistent with the statute and 
policies underlying copyright law and fair use, more so than merely 
looking to market harms suffered by the copyright owner.91 This full-
bodied look at market effects reflects how copyright owners are 
increasingly treating works that borrow from theirs. Moreover, building 
on Campbell’s fair use framework, courts are increasingly interpreting 
the market effects factor to look toward market benefits and harm in 
combination. 
The fair use section in the copyright statute makes it clear that courts 
are to look to “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work.”92 Nowhere does the statute indicate that 
courts should look just to the “negative effect” of the use.93 By stating 
that courts should look to “the effect” generally, the statute is naturally 
read as requiring a look at all effects of the use on the potential market 
for the copyrighted work, both positive and negative.94 
90. Cf. Pasquale, supra note 3, at 805–09 (observing in reflecting on the Sony decision, that 
consumers are frequently more likely to know about and purchase copyrighted works when they can 
preview, browse, and consume reviews of these works). 
91. For other scholarship exploring the possibility of market (as well as social) benefit playing a 
role in the market effects analysis, see, for example, Gregory M. Duhl, Old Lyrics, Knock-Off 
Videos, and Copycat Comic Books: The Fourth Fair Use Factor in U.S. Copyright Law, 54 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 665 (2004); Fagundes, supra note 88; Loren, supra note 3; Pasquale, supra note 
3; cf. William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1706 
(1988) (advocating that courts “must determine the universe of activities vis-a-vis [the copyrighted 
work] that would violate the Copyright Act if not excused by [fair use]”); Fromer, supra note 29, at 
113–17 (explaining the social benefits that can arise from permitting fair use of copyrighted 
material for journalism and news reporting, parody, criticism and commentary, and scholarship and 
research); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975, 
999 (2002) (“On one side of the balance, attention should be directed toward the extent to which 
prohibiting a particular use will lead to more and better works of authorship by asking: (1) whether 
the unauthorized use would otherwise reduce the revenue associated with the copyrighted work; and 
(2) if so, how, if at all, that reduction would likely affect the production of copyrighted works. On 
the other side of the balance, we must consider what the public stands to lose if the use is 
prohibited.” (emphasis in original)). 
92. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012). 
93. Fagundes, supra note 88, at 361–62. 
94. Id. The statute encodes fair use with the purpose of enshrining past cases on fair use as well as 
enabling courts to continue their common-law-making in this area. See supra text accompanying 
note 49. Though the many fair use cases that undergird the statutory encoding focused on, as David 
Fagundes puts it, “reduced demand for copy sales,” Congress chose to enact into law a full-bodied 
effects factor. Fagundes, supra note 88, at 370–77. Even were the statute to be read to look only to 
market harms, Congress gave the courts license to change this examination through development of 
the common law, including the addition of other relevant factors into the fair use calculus. See supra 
text accompanying note 49. 
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A full-bodied assessment of market effects fits better with the policies 
underpinning copyright law and fair use than an assessment that looks to 
market harms alone. Recall that the goal of a utilitarian copyright law is 
to provide authors with sufficient incentive to make and distribute 
valuable creative works, but not so much incentive in terms of copyright 
protection as to interfere with the creation of valuable follow-on works 
(works that build on existing works).95 The copyright incentive is 
specifically about encouraging authors to create when they otherwise 
might not out of fear of being copied and harmed in the marketplace.96 
As Mark Lemley and I have argued, intellectual property regimes, like 
copyright, should never allow an infringement claim to succeed absent 
market substitution, or harm, because “a use that does not interfere with 
the plaintiff’s market in some way generally does no relevant harm.”97 
When the benefits that accrue to a copyright holder from a defendant’s 
use of the copyrighted work exceed its harms, there is typically no 
overall harm to the copyright holder and thus copyright law ought to 
remain unconcerned with aiding the copyright holder. An investigation 
of market harms in isolation misses this crucial connection to copyright 
policy’s consideration of overall market effects.98 
Of course, the net market benefits that a copyright holder might 
experience from a third party’s unauthorized use might still be lower 
than those that the copyright holder would experience without such 
usage. Surely, lower overall benefits might diminish a copyright holder’s 
incentive to create. Evaluation of market effects—benefits and harms—
should compare the overall effect with the effects that would tend to 
exist absent a third party’s unauthorized use to see how, if at all, the use 
might diminish copyright’s incentive. 
Copyright’s fair use policy also confirms that one ought to look at 
market harms and benefits together. Recall that fair use exists to rescue 
from infringement uses that are socially beneficial.99 When a copyright 
owner has forbidden a use that accrues to it market benefit—and to 
society’s benefit as well—fair use theory would suggest permissiveness 
95. See supra Part I.A. 
96. See supra Part I.A. 
97. Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property Infringement, 
112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1255 (2014). 
98. In fact, if the market benefits to the copyright owner exceed the market harms, there ought to 
be no actual damages awardable in the copyright action. Duhl, supra note 91, at 673–74. 
Nonetheless, the possibility of awards of statutory damages in copyright infringement suits, 17 
U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012), suggests that courts might not want to deem such beneficial uses to be 
anything other than fair. 
99. See supra Part I.A. 
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toward that use. Societal benefit from a work is not the same as the 
copyright holder’s own market benefits from a work. One can imagine 
works that society might benefit from having—such as three-
dimensional sculptures of two-dimensional art or retellings of stories 
from a minor character’s perspective—that might not benefit the 
copyright holder of the original work. Yet whenever there are market 
benefits to a copyright holder from a subsequent use of the copyrighted 
work, it is likely because some significant set of consumers is willing to 
pay for—and thus would benefit from—the existence of this subsequent 
use. That is, there may be societal benefits from a use without 
concomitant market benefits to the copyright owner, but when there are 
market benefits to the copyright owner, there tends also to be societal 
benefit. All in all, policies weighing in favor of fair use suggest that 
market benefits to the copyright holder offer a signal that there is a 
societal benefit favoring fair use, which might also benefit the copyright 
holder. 
There is no solid countervailing reason for considering only market 
harms, and ignoring market benefits, in evaluating market effects 
bearing on fair use. One might reason that copyright holders get to 
choose whether or not to exploit a particular market within the scope of 
their protection.100 But that objection does not hold water. For one thing, 
the whole purpose of fair use is to excuse infringement liability 
sometimes for socially valuable uses, even when the copyright holder 
has opted not to exploit the particular use at issue.101 More generally, 
however, the reasoning underpinning this objection actually ought to be 
built into the calculus of market effects experienced by a copyright 
owner. That is, if copyright owners are experiencing potential harms to 
their copyright market from a defendant’s use, which exploits a market 
the copyright owner chose not to enter, that ought to be a market harm 
weighed as part of the market effects bearing on fair use. As such, this 
objection merely speaks in favor of a full-bodied weighing of the harms 
and benefits to potential markets experienced by a copyright holder from 
a defendant’s use. 
Some copyright holders are ever more frequently acting on the 
100. Courts frequently assert as much. See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 
Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 145–46 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Although Castle Rock has evidenced little if any 
interest in exploiting this market for derivative works based on Seinfeld, such as by creating and 
publishing Seinfeld trivia books (or at least trivia books that endeavor to ‘satisfy’ the ‘between-
episode cravings’ of Seinfeld lovers), the copyright law must respect that creative and economic 
choice.”). See generally Fagundes, supra note 88, at 391–93 (recounting this possible objection). 
101. See supra Part I.A. 
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realization that there are market benefits to them from tolerating uses of 
their works they would have battled in years past. Take Disney, which 
has been litigiously protective of its copyrighted material in the past. For 
example, in a prominent fair use case in 1978, Disney won a claim of 
copyright infringement by “an underground comic book . . . centered 
around a rather bawdy depiction of the Disney characters as active 
members of a free thinking, promiscuous, drug ingesting 
counterculture.”102 There, the Ninth Circuit rejected the defendants’ 
claim of fair use on the ground that they borrowed from Disney’s 
copyrighted works more than was necessary to conjure up its 
characters.103 Fast-forward to the present, and Disney has changed its 
tune, at least in some situations. For example, since it released its 2013 
hit movie Frozen, it has not sought to rein in those who have covered, 
parodied, or built on the songs, characters, and other material from this 
movie.104 It took no public action against a widely shared YouTube 
video of a father singing about the annoying ubiquity of the movie’s 
“Let It Go” song to that song’s tune105 or a YouTube video singing a 
pro-cocaine song (“Do You Wanna Do Some Blow, Man?”) set to 
another popular song from the movie,106 let alone the thousands of other 
YouTube videos offering makeup tutorials to look like Frozen’s 
characters, covers of the movie’s songs, parodies of the movie’s scenes, 
and the like.107 Although Disney has not officially stated its reasons for 
not pursuing copyright infringement claims against these video creators, 
many think the evidence points in favor of Disney realizing that “fan-
created content—even in cases where that content is generating revenue 
that is not captured by Disney—is cross-promotional marketing that 
money can’t buy.”108 As for Disney’s bottom line, it is an 
102. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1978) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
103. Id. at 756–58. 
104. See Leonard, supra note 16. 
105. Scott S. Kramer, A Frozen Father (“Let It Go” Dad Parody), YOUTUBE (Mar. 2, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Ud6B_NXoNc. 
106. BREEesrig, Do You Wanna Do Some Blow, Man? Frozen Parody, YOUTUBE (July 22, 
2014), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ur43PZ2jYMo. 
107. See, e.g., jazzynice9, Corpse Bride – “The Other Woman” Scene (Frozen Parody), 
YOUTUBE (May 17, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
pu7Jsu4NJQk; dope2111, Disney’s Frozen Elsa Makeup Tutorial, YOUTUBE (Feb. 12, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_V7iMAv0mY4; Malinda K. Reese, “Let It Go” from Frozen 
According to Google Translate (Parody), YOUTUBE (Feb. 10, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2bVAoVlFYf0. 
108. Leonard, supra note 16. As one piece of evidence, in 2014, Disney bought Maker Studios, 
which is a network of YouTube channels that helps generate and professionalize grassroots creative 
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understatement to say that Frozen does not seem to have been hurt by 
these parodies and related works. It has become the most profitable 
animated movie ever, making over one billion dollars,109 not to mention 
the revenues Disney has made or expects from Frozen costumes, music 
sales, makeup, books, theme park experiences, and cruises.110 
Disney’s discovery of the possible market benefits from tolerating 
unauthorized—or even merely uncontrolled—uses of its copyrighted 
works is nothing new. For example, movie studios have long held press 
screenings of pending movie releases so that movie critics can prepare 
and publish movie reviews when the movie is released.111 Studios 
generally hold these screenings even though they do not have control 
over the content of the reviews and know that the critics might use 
copyrightable expression from screened movies, in the hopes that good 
reviews and publicity will outweigh any negative attention and help 
promote these movies at the box office.112 Similarly, the reappearance of 
an older song in new contexts—movies, television shows, 
advertisements, or as covers—can propel sales of the old song.113 For 
example, a 2008 performance on American Idol by contestant Jason 
Castro of Jeff Buckley’s 1994 cover of Leonard Cohen’s song 
“Hallelujah” boosted the Buckley recording to the top digital song in the 
United States (and the top seller on iTunes, even as the Castro recording 
was also available for iTunes purchase).114 
What is new is the confluence of low costs for creating, 
videos. Id. 
109. Leon Lazaroff, Disney’s ‘Frozen’ Will Become the Biggest Franchise Ever, THESTREET 
(Nov. 7, 2014, 7:07 AM), http://www.thestreet.com/story/12943710/1/disneys-frozen-will-become-
the-biggest-franchise-ever.html. 
110. See Michal Lev-Ram, Frozen: Do You Wanna Build an Empire?, FORTUNE (Dec. 22, 2014, 
1:51 PM), http://fortune.com/2014/12/22/do-you-wanna-build-an-empire. 
111. Amanda Mae Meyncke, How Press Screenings Work, FILM.COM (Oct. 28, 2010), 
http://www.film.com/movies/how-press-screenings-work. 
112. Cf. Jonathan Bailey, Copyright Tips for Review Sites, PLAGIARISM TODAY (Jan. 6, 2010), 
https://www.plagiarismtoday.com/2010/01/06/copyright-tips-for-review-sites (providing advice for 
how to use copyrighted content in reviews without infringing copyrights). Studios sometimes 
choose not to hold any press screenings of an upcoming movie if they think the movie is likely to be 
poorly reviewed and suffer at the box office. See Tim Ryan, Breaking News: Movies Not Screened 
for Critics Aren’t Very Good, ROTTEN TOMATOES (Apr. 5, 2006), http://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/ 
benchwarmers/news/1646591/breaking_news_movies_not_screened_for_critics_arent_very_good. 
113. Chris Molanphy, The Slow Hit Movement: Year-Old Songs on the Pop Charts, NPR MUSIC 
(June 29, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/therecord/2013/06/28/196678642/the-slow-hit-
movement-year-old-songs-on-the-pop-charts. 
114. See Chris Molanphy, Bonkers for Buckley: America’s Dead Idol, IDOLATOR (Mar. 14, 
2008), http://www.idolator.com/368015/bonkers-for-buckley-americas-dead-idol. 
 
                                                     
06 - Fromer.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2015  1:26 PM 
636 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:615 
disseminating, and indexing user-generated content.115 Now that 
consumers and artists can easily make and share content that borrows 
from copyrighted works in ways that might comment on it, there are yet 
more opportunities for market benefits to accrue to the copyright holders 
from this secondary content.116 Consider Gotye’s song, “Somebody That 
I Used To Know,” the top song on Billboard’s Hot 100 chart for 2012.117 
Many fans freely recorded covers of the song and made them available 
on YouTube.118 Gotye responded to these videos not with a copyright 
infringement suit, but by stitching together under one hundred of these 
videos into a mashup of his song he called “Somebodies, A YouTube 
Orchestra,” which he shared freely on YouTube.119 Gotye must have 
thought that these user-generated covers of his popular song helped the 
song’s popularity yet further by showing how “people seem to really 
respond to the song,” and his “orchestra” generated further attention for 
him and his song.120 In essence, Gotye took one step further Disney’s 
realization that fan videos can, by referencing the underlying 
copyrighted work from which it takes, call attention to the work and gain 
it exposure. As Sarah Trombley explains, “far from substituting for the 
original, [fan videos] often demand that the original be consumed as well 
in order to be understood, just as most of the impact of Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern Are Dead would be lost if the reader were unfamiliar with 
Hamlet.”121 
Courts vary in their inclusion of market benefits as a component of 
the market effects bearing on fair use. Some courts do not give credence 
115. See generally Edward Lee, Warming up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1459. 
116. These greater opportunities for market benefits might arrive hand in hand with more chance 
for market harms by such secondary content as well. 
117. Hot 100 Songs: Year End 2012, BILLBOARD, http://www.billboard.com/charts/year-end/ 
2012/hot-100-songs (last visited Feb. 2, 2015). 
118. Evan Schlansky, Gotye Gets Meta with “Somebodies, a YouTube Orchestra,” AM. 
SONGWRITER, (Aug. 14, 2012, 2:02 PM), http://www.americansongwriter.com/2012/08/gotye-gets-
meta-with-somebodies-a-youtube-orchestra. 
119. gotyemusic, Gotye - Somebodies: A YouTube Orchestra, YOUTUBE (Aug. 12, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=opg4VGvyi3M; see also Wally, Original Videos Used in 
Somebodies: A YouTube Orchestra, GOTYE.COM (Aug. 4, 2012, 1:45 PM), http://gotye.com/reader/ 
items/original-videos-used-in-somebodies-a-youtube-orchestra.html#blog.html (listing the videos 
incorporated into the mashup). 
120.  Schlansky, supra note 118; see also Gotye Makes Supercut Remix of ‘Somebody That I 
Used to Know’ Covers, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/ 
videos/gotye-makes-supercut-remix-of-somebody-that-i-used-to-know-covers-20120813. As of 
February 2, 2015, this video was viewed 4,338,436 times. gotyemusic, supra note 119.  
121. Sarah Trombley, Visions and Revisions: Fanvids and Fair Use, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 647, 669 (2007) (arguing that such fan videos should qualify as fair use). 
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to any market benefits even when they are readily apparent. For 
example, the Eleventh Circuit held in 2001 that The Wind Done Gone—
a reinterpretation of the story in Gone with the Wind from the view of 
Scarlett O’Hara’s half-sister Cynara, a bi-racial slave on Scarlett’s 
plantation—would likely be fair use due to its transformative nature.122 
It made this determination without recognizing any potential market 
benefits to Gone with the Wind’s copyright holder.123 Yet The Wind 
Done Gone might have caused more sales of Gone with the Wind, by 
placing it front and center back in the news and other discussions.124 
Similarly, consider a Honda car commercial featuring a well-dressed 
young couple being chased by a grotesque villain who jumps on the 
car’s roof and is then dispatched by the male driver’s effortless release 
of the car’s detachable roof.125 A district court held in 1995 that this 
commercial likely infringed the copyrightable James Bond character and 
was also not a fair use of it.126 In ruling against the probability of fair 
use, the court stated that “it is likely that James Bond’s association with 
a low-end Honda model will threaten [James Bond’s] value in the eyes 
of future upscale licensees.”127 The court did not consider that viewers of 
the car commercial might have been stimulated to see James Bond 
movies, a potential market benefit bearing on fair use.128 
Likewise, the Second Circuit, in 1998, refused to recognize any 
market benefits to the copyright owner of the Seinfeld television series 
from the publication of a book of Seinfeld trivia questions—such as 
whetting fans’ appetites—and dwelled only on harms to the copyright 
owner’s potential derivative markets.129 Its reasoning was similar to that 
articulated by a district court two years later in a copyright infringement 
suit brought by musical recording copyright owners against MP3.com, 
122. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001). 
123. Id. at 1275–76. 
124. See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, A Writer’s Tough Lesson in Birthin’ a Parody, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 26, 2001, at E1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/26/books/a-writer-s-tough-
lesson-in-birthin-a-parody.html (denoting one example of the prominent coverage of The Wind 
Done Gone, which also discussed Gone with the Wind). 
125. ibpimin, Honda Del Sol Commercial, YOUTUBE (June 27, 2006), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=gqa-b3assCA. 
126. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1297–1301 (C.D. 
Cal. 1995). 
127. Id. at 1300. 
128. See id. There are many other such examples. See, e.g., Jackson v. Warner Bros., Inc., 993 F. 
Supp. 585, 590–92 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (not considering that sales for an artist’s two lithographs that 
appeared in two scenes of a movie might have increased in ascertaining fair use). 
129. Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 143–46 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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an Internet company that made MP3 files of recordings available to 
subscribers: In response to the defendant’s argument that it enhanced 
sales of recordings because subscribers could get an MP3 file only if 
they had already bought a corresponding CD copy of the recording, the 
court noted that “[a]ny allegedly positive impact of [the] defendant’s 
activities on [the] plaintiffs’ prior market in no way frees defendant to 
usurp a further market that directly derives from reproduction of the 
plaintiffs’ copyrighted works.”130 This reasoning is merely a variant of 
the argument against considering market benefits rejected above.131 
Other courts, often prominently, have begun to take market benefits, 
along with market harms, into account in considering market effects 
bearing on fair use. In 2013, the Southern District of New York ruled 
that Google’s unauthorized use of short snippets from millions of 
copyrighted book in its book search engine is a fair use.132 The plaintiffs 
had argued that “Google Books will negatively impact the market for 
books and that Google’s scans will serve as a ‘market replacement’ for 
books.”133 Not only did the court think this result was unlikely because 
of how Google Books operates, but that the opposite was true: 
To the contrary, a reasonable factfinder could only find that 
Google Books enhances the sales of books to the benefit of 
copyright holders. An important factor in the success of an 
individual title is whether it is discovered—whether potential 
readers learn of its existence. Google Books provides a way for 
authors’ works to become noticed, much like traditional in-store 
book displays. Indeed, both librarians and their patrons use 
Google Books to identify books to purchase. Many authors have 
noted that online browsing in general and Google Books in 
particular helps readers find their work, thus increasing their 
audiences. Further, Google provides convenient links to 
booksellers to make it easy for a reader to order a book. In this 
day and age of on-line shopping, there can be no doubt but that 
Google Books improves books sales.134 
130. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); cf. DC 
Comics Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982) (“Since one of the benefits of 
ownership of copyrighted material is the right to license its use for a fee, even a speculated increase 
in DC [Comic]’s comic book sales as a consequence of [the defendant’s] infringement would not 
call the fair use defense into play as a matter of law. The owner of the copyright is in the best 
position to balance the prospect of increased sales against revenue from a license.”). 
131. See supra text accompanying notes 100–101. 
132. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
133. Id. at 292. 
134. Id. at 293 (citations omitted). 
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In other cases, courts similarly reason that rather than cause market 
harm, a defendant’s incorporation of an obscure copyrighted work into 
its work may shine a light on the copyrighted work and lead to 
“newfound interest” in it.135 Courts have found market benefit 
outweighing market harm in a variety of contexts, such as a 
documentary movie about a nineteenth-century Yiddish author using 
clips from copyrighted Yiddish films as “background for scholarly 
commentary,”136 a children’s television program using hand puppets,137 
and a film displaying artwork consisting of pastel-colored teddy bears on 
a hanging mobile.138 Other courts have considered market benefits 
alongside market harms but have determined that the harms outweigh 
the benefits—such as for a television network’s copying and broadcast 
of portions of a student-produced film biography of a champion 
wrestler—thus weighing against fair use.139 
135. Nat’l Ctr. for Jewish Film v. Riverside Films LLC, No. 5:12-cv-000044-ODW(DTBx), 2012 
WL 4052111, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2012). 
136. Id. 
137. Mura v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 245 F. Supp. 587, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
138. Amsinck v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1044, 1045, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
For other court rulings emphasizing the relevance of market benefits in assessing the market effects 
bearing on fair use, see, for example, Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 390, 396–97 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(recognizing fair use and market benefits to the copyright holder from the use of his manuscript in a 
child custody lawsuit for evidentiary value of its content insofar as it contained admissions that the 
copyright holder may have made against his interest when he bragged about his conduct in 
murdering his father, in taking advantage of the juvenile justice system, and in benefiting from his 
father’s estate); Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1370, 1377 (2d Cir. 
1993) (ruling for the copyright owner for the Twin Peaks television show on the market effects 
bearing on fair use in a suit against the author and publisher of a guide to the show, even as it 
recognized and weighed that “works like theirs provide helpful publicity and thereby tend to confer 
an economic benefit on the copyright holder”); Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 
1256–57, 1264 (2d Cir. 1986) (reasoning that “it is not beyond the realm of possibility that [the 
defendant’s] book [of essays on abortion that quoted from the plaintiff’s book of interviews of 
women discussing their experiences with abortion and unwanted pregnancy] might stimulate further 
interest in” the plaintiff’s earlier work); Hofheinz v. AMC Prods., Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 127, 140 
(E.D.N.Y. 2001) (recognizing possible market benefits to the copyright owner of monster movies 
and still photographs in its suit against the producers of a television documentary on the monster-
movie genre’s development, in the sense that “the Documentary may increase market demand for 
plaintiff’s copyrighted works and make more people aware of the influence that [it] had in 
developing the ‘B’ movie genre. Moreover, defendants’ brief display of the photographs, poster, and 
model monsters at issue should only increase consumer demand as well as the value of those items 
after the Documentary heightens public awareness of [the plaintiff’s] role in shaping Hollywood 
productions”); and compare Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 549–51 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (suggesting that an encyclopedia for the Harry Potter book series would not harm 
the series’ book sales because other publishers sometimes sell encyclopedias as companions to their 
book series and readers consume both types of works for different purposes). 
139. See Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 621 F.2d 57, 58, 62 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
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It makes sense as a legal, policy, and business matter to consider 
market benefits together with market harms to yield a well-rounded 
consideration of the market effects bearing on fair use, as some courts 
have been doing. A consideration of market benefits alongside market 
harms also solves a longstanding concern with circular and short-
circuited reasoning in consideration of the fourth fair use factor. Some 
courts hold that the mere possibility that a licensing market does or 
could exist for a copyrighted work is enough to weigh against finding 
fair use, because it signifies market harm.140 This reasoning, however, is 
conclusory, because as Second Circuit Judge Pierre Leval recognizes in 
his foundational article on fair use, “every fair use involves some loss of 
royalty revenue because the secondary user has not paid royalties.”141 It 
is on that basis that other courts have been skeptical that the mere 
glimmer or even the full-fledged development of a licensing market is 
enough to damn a defendant’s use.142 Yet this reasoning is problematic 
as well because it ignores the possibility that the copyright owner could 
realistically be harmed in its licensing market. 
As a way out of this reasoning, Judge Leval suggests that the 
possibility of a licensing market ought to weigh against fair use only 
“[w]hen the injury to the copyright holder’s potential market would 
substantially impair the incentive to create works for publication.”143 
Recall that copyright theory suggests that this impairment of incentives 
would happen when a creator experiences market harms that exceed his 
or her market benefits—that is, when the net market effects experienced 
by the creator are negative (or are substantially lower than they would be 
without a particular unauthorized use).144 By contrast, this incentive—
whether as to a particular licensing market or writ large over all 
copyright-possible markets—would not be substantially impaired when 
140. See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929–31 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(weighing against fair use the potential licensing revenues academic journal publishers lost from 
Texaco employees photocopying journal articles for no additional cost). 
141. Leval, supra note 40, at 1124; accord Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 46, at 688 (“Too broad 
an interpretation of the potential market, however, presents its own dangers. If taken to a logical 
extreme, the fourth factor would always weigh against fair use, since there is always a potential 
market that the copyright owner could in theory license. By definition, once the affirmative defense 
of fair use is invoked, there has already been a finding of infringement. Accordingly, the 
defendant’s use necessarily falls within the area of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights and 
therefore could have been licensed.”). 
142. See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 613–15 (2d Cir. 
2006) (refusing to consider a loss of licensing revenues for Grateful Dead concert posters that were 
published in smaller form in an illustrated history of the band). 
143. Leval, supra note 40, at 1125. 
144. See supra Part I.A. 
 
                                                     
06 - Fromer.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2015  1:26 PM 
2015] MARKET EFFECTS BEARING ON FAIR USE 641 
there is a market harm, so long as there is a greater market benefit. 
More generally speaking, so long as a court assesses all market harms 
and benefits that surpass a particular threshold of speculativeness, it is 
entirely germane that a court factor the harms the copyright owner might 
experience in a licensing market for that use into the market effects 
bearing on fair use.145 As long as the court is evaluating a 
comprehensive set of market effects, the court will be able to assess 
whether there is overall market harm that would interfere with a 
copyright holder’s incentive to create valuable works. Surely harm to the 
licensing market for the defendant’s use is relevant. But it is only 
relevant and non-conclusory if the court is similarly assessing just-as-
likely market benefits.146 
In sum, Campbell’s fair use analysis ought to be read to require 
consideration of both market harms and benefits—so long as these 
harms and benefits surpass a certain degree of speculativeness—to 
determine the market effects bearing on fair use. The statute, copyright 
policy, and business realities justify this understanding of the fourth fair 
use factor. Moreover, this understanding alleviates conclusory reasoning 
that is often present in assessing market effects bearing on fair use, by 
not merely including or excluding licensing harms a copyright holder 
always might suffer from the defendant’s use. I now turn to consider 
why Campbell takes a further step to exclude certain market effects from 
bearing on fair use and how that generally ought to shape fair use 
analysis. 
III.  CONSIDERING ONLY POTENTIAL AND COPYRIGHT-
RELEVANT MARKET EFFECTS 
Recall that in Campbell the Court sought to recognize that 
145. Some market effects are too speculative to include, and some market effects are outweighed 
by others that are likely to co-occur. For example, William F. Patry and Shira Perlmutter write that 
“a copyright owner could theoretically . . . license book reviews as well as serializations. But while 
a serialization may satisfy some readers’ desire to purchase the book, few interested in reading a 
novel are likely to be satisfied by a review. Including in the potential market uses such as book 
reviews is therefore inappropriate.” Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 46, at 688. 
146. Cf. Pasquale, supra note 3, at 810–11 (indicating that the widespread circular analyses of fair 
use would be undermined by a more comprehensive analysis of the fourth fair use factor). In order 
for the court to assess market effects, only harms and benefits that exceed a certain degree of 
speculativeness can be considered. If the court were to consider any harm, no matter how 
speculative, but only more certain market benefits, the court would be weighing the market effects 
unrealistically and unfairly, by putting a heavy thumb on the scale for market harm. Alternatively, 
courts could take into account all market effects, no matter how speculative, but weigh each effect 
based on its degree of speculativeness. 
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transformative works, such as parodies, are unlikely to cause overall 
market harm to a copyright owner.147 Yet this recognition alone, the 
Court must have realized, was insufficient to assess the full effect of a 
parody on the market for a copyrighted work (and derivative markets). A 
complete picture might show the copyrighted work suffering from 
criticism—and thus harm—due to a successful parody. In conducting its 
analysis, the Court stated that there are market effects that are irrelevant 
to a fair use determination. In this vein, the Campbell Court ruled that 
there is “no protectible derivative market for criticism.”148 Thus, market 
harms to the copyrighted work due to scathing criticism are not true 
copyright harms and are thus irrelevant market effects.149 
Without further justification, a rule excluding derivative markets for 
criticism as irrelevant to the fair use analysis merely parrots the 
conclusion that criticism ought to qualify as a fair use because any 
market harms that flow from it are irrelevant. Because many fair use 
cases are about critical uses, this rule should be probed further. 
There are two justifiable ways to understand the Court’s ruling that 
there is “no protectible derivative market for criticism.”150 Each offers 
up a rule of guidance for courts in deciding which market effects are 
relevant to the fair use analysis: Market effects are irrelevant if they are 
empirically implausible, and market effects ought to be excluded unless 
they are copyright-relevant. I explore each in turn. 
A.  Empirically Plausible Markets 
First, the Campbell analysis seems to be, at least loosely, empirically 
grounded. The Court reasoned that “the unlikelihood that creators of 
imaginative works will license critical reviews or lampoons of their own 
productions removes such uses from the very notion of a potential 
licensing market.”151 So long as there is no conceivable potential market 
that a copyright owner would exploit in the original or derivative work, 
it is irrelevant to the analysis of the fourth fair use factor, the effect on 
the market.152 
147. See supra text accompanying note 76. 
148. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994). 
149. See supra text accompanying notes 77–79. 
150. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592. 
151. Id. 
152. This exclusion does not solve another problem in fair use reasoning: that risk-averse users 
pay for copyright licenses for uses that might reasonably be considered fair to avoid the cost of 
copyright litigation, which then creates an unneeded license for copyrighted works, which then 
weighs against fair use as a relevant market harm. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 8, at 887–906. 
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So understood, the exclusion of inconceivable potential markets from 
the analysis is sensible. Recall that the statute asks courts to evaluate 
“the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.”153 Truly inconceivable potential markets are not 
potential in any relevant way. Copyright policy suggests they have no 
place in analysis of this fair use factor: They are not likely to affect the 
copyright holder’s incentive to produce valuable works in the first place, 
so they are irrelevant costs in the cost-benefit calculus of copyright 
infringement and fair use.154 This understanding of Campbell suggests 
that courts ruling on fair use should exclude all inconceivable markets 
from consideration in the fourth fair use factor.155 
Some courts appear to follow this rule and refuse to consider 
empirically dubious market effects in its calculus of market effects 
bearing on fair use. For example, a photographer sued the Associated 
Press for copyright infringement for a press report it made on a new 
business venture by Oliver North, which included a photo of the 
business’s sale brochure cover.156 In assessing fair use, the court rejected 
the photographer’s claims of market harm in the market for his photos as 
too speculative because there was absolutely no evidence of any interest 
in these photos other than for the sales brochure itself.157 In another case, 
Richard Wright’s widow sued a biographer for use of Wright’s journal 
153. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012). 
154. Cf. Fromer & Lemley, supra note 97, at 1300–01 (“While the line between infringement and 
fair use is murky, certain categories of works tend to be favored as fair: parodies or other uses that 
transform the original work into one with a new meaning, uses of copyrighted works in news 
reporting or historical research, and uses in comparative advertising, to name a few. The four 
traditional fair-use factors often point in favor of these works in these classes of cases, principally 
because they do not compete in the market with the copyrighted work and because they are valuable 
in promoting the progress of culture and knowledge.”). 
155. Another possibility would be, as Bill Patry suggests, to “include only those uses that the 
copyright owner has actually licensed or is negotiating to license.” PATRY, supra note 4, § 6:8, at 
556. A concern with this approach, however, is one Patry readily emphasizes: It “puts copyright 
owners at risk from third parties who rush to exploit conventional markets before the copyright 
owner does.” Id. Moreover, it is inconsistent with granting copyright owners rights in derivative 
works. Cf. Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 46, at 689–90. Patry thus adds nuance to this possibility 
by suggesting that delay in entering a market or lack of interest in a market could be used as a basis 
to exclude consideration of effects in that particular market in the fourth factor. PATRY, supra note 
4, § 6:8, at 557. 
156. Mathieson v. Associated Press, No. 90 Civ. 6945 (LMM), 1992 WL 164447, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1992). 
157. Id. at *8–9. Similarly, in an infringement suit by the photographer Annie Leibovitz over a 
movie poster parodying Leibovitz’s notorious photograph of a nude pregnant actress, Demi Moore, 
the court found no market harm because Leibovitz had “not identified any market for a derivative 
work that might be harmed by” the poster. Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 
116 n.6 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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entries and letters.158 The court refused to weigh as a market harm the 
possibility of a separately published Wright collection of letters, because 
such a project had been negotiated decades earlier but had stalled for a 
variety of reasons and was unlikely to materialize.159 Consider similarly 
the First Circuit’s decision on the use of semi-nude modeling 
photographs of Miss Puerto Rico Universe in a news story about a 
scandal concerning those photographs’ propriety.160 The court held the 
use to be fair, and in doing so, it excluded from its consideration of 
market effects bearing on fair use “the potential market for the 
photographs [for] the sale to newspapers for . . . illustrating 
controversy.”161 The court did so because “[s]urely the market for 
professional photographs of models publishable only due to the 
controversy of the photograph itself is small or nonexistent.”162 By 
contrast, the Third Circuit was willing to consider a market in movie 
previews as part of its fair use assessment of a video clip compiler’s 
previews from copyrighted movies precisely because there was an extant 
marketplace for these previews among various websites, over the 
compiler’s objections that there is no such marketplace because 
consumers do not pay for movie previews.163 
A focus on truly potential markets underscores the need for more 
evidence-based decision-making with regard to intellectual property and 
less conjecture. Empirical research bearing on intellectual property laws 
is beginning to grow,164 and for good reason.165 Justice Souter’s 
158. Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 734 (2d Cir. 1991). 
159. Id. at 739. 
160. Núñez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 2000). 
161. Id. at 25. 
162. Id. 
163. Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 202 (3d Cir. 2003). 
164. This body of scholarship uses different methodologies, including social-science experiments 
and statistical studies of natural data to start answering important questions about innovation policy. 
See, e.g., David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Poisoning the Next Apple?: The America Invents Act 
and Individual Inventors, 65 STAN. L. REV. 517, 517–18 (2013) (predicting from a study of natural 
data in the United States and Canada that recent changes to American patent law will negatively 
affect individual inventors); Christopher Buccafusco, Zachary C. Burns, Jeanne C. Fromer & 
Christopher Jon Sprigman, Experimental Tests of Intellectual Property Laws’ Creativity Thresholds, 
92 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1946–72 (2014) (reporting four original experiments designed to measure the 
effects of different thresholds, much like intellectual property laws’, on creativity); C. Scott 
Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug Patents?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL L. 
STUD. 613, 613 (2011) (applying econometric techniques to study the effects of brand-name drug 
sales on the likelihood of generic drug companies’ patent challenges); Mark A. Lemley, Su Li, & 
Jennifer M. Urban, Does Familiarity Breed Contempt Among Judges Deciding Patent Cases?, 66 
STAN. L. REV. 1121, 1121 (2014) (studying the statistical relationship between district court judges’ 
experience and patent case outcomes, and finding that more experienced judges are less likely to 
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reasoning in Campbell that markets for criticism are not plausibly 
potential ought to serve as an appeal to determine sturdy methodologies 
for separating out plausibly potential markets from implausible ones and 
to assess the scope of truly potential markets in important copyright 
industries. More robust research on methodologies and industries would 
promote more accurate and just fair use determinations. 
It cannot go unsaid, however, that in important ways, Campbell’s 
specific conclusion about the unlikelihood of licensing markets in 
criticism is empirically dubious. Be it moviemakers’ general desire to 
have critics review their movies, warts and all,166 copyright holders’ 
grants of permission to Weird Al Yankovic to lampoon their songs,167 or 
Disney’s tolerance of parodies of songs from its movie Frozen 
criticizing how addictive the movie is, copyright owners sometimes do 
seek out a licensing market of sorts in criticism.168 Granted, many 
copyright owners likely have no interest in crafting a market for 
criticism of their works. Yet even Campbell’s particular conclusion, that 
there is no plausible potential market that copyright owners would create 
for criticism, ought to be open to empirical examination, particularly in 
light of doubts about its accuracy.169 
In sum, this section demonstrates that one way to understand 
Campbell’s exclusion of criticism as a relevant market effect is to see it 
as an empirically unlikely market. On that reading and for reasons 
consonant with copyright policy, empirically unlikely market effects 
ought to be excluded from consideration of the fourth fair use factor. 
rule for the patentee). 
165. We know too little about the validity of various assumptions underlying intellectual property 
laws and the implications of these laws. John Golden, Rob Merges, and Pam Samuelson express a 
hope of “ever greater commitment to more systematic and sophisticated studies of intellectual 
property’s normative justifications, empirical context, and actual and potential practical 
performance.” John M. Golden, Robert P. Merges & Pamela Samuelson, The Path of IP Studies: 
Growth, Diversification, and Hope, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1757, 1759 (2014). 
166. See supra text accompanying notes 111–112 (discussing why movie studios hold press 
screenings before movie releases); cf. Studios Trying to Keep Critics from Bad Movies, TODAY.COM 
(Apr. 12, 2006, 10:37 AM), http://www.today.com/id/12154435#.VMhqz_7F9h4. 
167. ‘Weird’ Al Yankovic Says Prince Is the Only Artist Ever to Turn Down One of His Parodies, 
NME (July 24, 2014, 1:40 PM), http://www.nme.com/news/various-artists/78754. 
168. See Kramer, supra note 105; Leonard, supra note 16. See generally supra text 
accompanying notes 102–116 (analyzing Disney’s market decisions with regard to Frozen). 
169. Whether these markets are ones that exist merely to cater to risk-averse users with otherwise 
strong fair use claims is another issue, see supra note 152, which is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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B.  Copyright-Relevant Markets 
There is another understanding of Campbell’s exclusion of a market 
for criticism from the market effects bearing on fair use. When 
discussing markets for criticism, Campbell contrasts them with 
“protectible markets for derivative works.”170 The contrast is striking, as 
it implies that criticism is outside the scope of a copyright owner’s rights 
in his or her work and derivative works. Campbell seeks to emphasize 
that market harms to the original work that come from scathing criticism 
are not true copyright harms. Such harms from criticism are, by likely 
inference, harms to unprotectable aspects of the original work, such as 
its ideas or how highly regarded society finds it.171 Benjamin Kaplan 
long ago alluded to such a rule in his writings on copyright law: A 
“parody may quite legitimately aim at garroting the original, destroying 
it commercially as well as artistically.”172 More generally, Campbell’s 
distinction suggests that before considering a market effect of a use on a 
copyright owner, the effect must both stem from the defendant’s use of 
protectable material and cause an effect that also falls within the scope 
of defendant’s copyright (in both the original work and derivative 
works). 
Consider the first of these copyright-relevant requirements. This rule 
would exclude market effects that stem from a defendant’s use of 
material that copyright law does not protect, regardless of the negative 
effect on the copyright owner. As Bill Patry elaborates in his treatise on 
fair use, “even though the taking of unprotectable material such as 
important ideas, laboriously researched facts, or the copying of the 
work’s overall style may cause lower sales, such losses should not be 
considered. The harm must be caused by the use of expression.”173 
Applying this rule to the situation in Campbell would exclude all market 
effects that arise from 2 Live Crew’s borrowing of ideas, expression that 
is not sufficiently creative, and other unprotected material from Roy 
Orbison’s song. Given that 2 Live Crew’s use of material from 
170. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994). 
171. See supra text accompanying note 77. 
172. BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 69 (1967); accord Fisher v. Dees, 
794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he economic effect of a parody with which we are concerned 
is not its potential to destroy or diminish the market for the original—any bad review can have that 
effect—but rather whether it fulfills the demand for the original. Biting criticism suppresses 
demand; copyright infringement usurps it. Thus, infringement occurs when a parody supplants the 
original in markets the original is aimed at, or in which the original is, or has reasonable potential to 
become, commercially valuable.” (emphasis in original)). 
173. PATRY, supra note 4, § 6:7 at 548. 
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Orbison’s song was done to criticize the original, some of the borrowed 
aspects are likely to be its ideas. Market effects stemming from taking 
these would be improper to consider in the fair use calculus because they 
are irrelevant to copyright law and are free for the taking as unprotected 
material. By contrast, only the market effects of 2 Live Crew’s use of 
protected expression from Orbison’s song (such as its characteristic riff 
and some of its lyrics) ought to be considered. 
That rule alone is not enough to consider only copyright-relevant 
market effects. Courts must also exclude market effects that stem from 
borrowing material protected by copyright law but whose repercussions 
are only to copyright owners in ways that are irrelevant to or unprotected 
by copyright law. Taking the Campbell example, only the copyright-
relevant market effects of 2 Live Crew’s use of protected expression 
from Orbison’s song ought to be considered. These are effects to the 
copyright owner’s interests in the original song’s expression and 
expression in derivative markets, such as the rap music market. Thus, for 
example, as Campbell itself spelled out, quite relevant and necessary for 
consideration are the “the parody’s effect on a market for a rap version 
of the original, either of the music alone or of the music with its 
lyrics.”174 On the other hand, harm that befalls the copyright owner due 
to the defendant’s use of copyrightable expression with regard to the 
idea motivating the song or the social value of the song, both outside the 
scope of the copyright, is irrelevant.175 
Some courts attempt to tease apart copyright-relevant market effects 
from irrelevant ones. For example, one district court excluded as 
copyright-irrelevant market effects harms to a copyright owner’s 
business services unrelated to copyright law, namely, a jet 
manufacturer’s maintenance-tracking services, which it claimed had 
been harmed by a competitor’s copying of its jet maintenance 
manuals.176 Similarly, consider a movie poster parodying photographer 
Annie Leibovitz’s notorious photograph of a nude pregnant actress, 
Demi Moore.177 The Second Circuit refused to give credence to 
174. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593. 
175. Cf. Leval, supra note 40, at 1125 (“Not every type of market impairment opposes fair use. 
An adverse criticism impairs a book’s market. A biography may impair the market for books by the 
subject if it exposes him as a fraud, or satisfies the public’s interest in that person. Such market 
impairments are not relevant to the fair use determination. The fourth factor disfavors a finding of 
fair use only when the market is impaired because the quoted material serves the consumer as a 
substitute . . . . Only to that extent are the purposes of copyright implicated.”). 
176. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Camp Sys. Int’l, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1379–80 (S.D. 
Ga. 2006). 
177. Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 111 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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Leibovitz’s worry, in her copyright infringement suit over the poster, 
about “the effect that the parody could have on her ‘special 
relationships’ with the celebrities whom she has made a living 
photographing.”178 The court reasoned that “[t]he possibility of criticism 
or comment—whether or not parodic—is a risk artists and their subjects 
must accept.”179 In another suit by the publisher of Consumer Reports 
magazine against a vacuum cleaner company for using a quote from its 
review in television commercials, the Second Circuit refused to 
recognize any harm that might befall the magazine from appearing 
biased due to its quotes appearing in product advertisements, because 
any harm of bias has nothing to do with copyright law.180 
More generally, the Seventh Circuit has observed that copyright law 
ought not to give a business a monopoly over a business interest that is 
not within the scope of the business’s copyrighted works or its possible 
derivative works.181 This rule has applications in a number of different 
contexts in which courts decide fair use: Copyright-irrelevant effects 
include those about ideas and criticism of them,182 the societal value 
attributed to a work,183 reverse engineering of copyrighted software to 
derive unprotectable aspects of the program—functionality and interface 
concerns—to use in compatible software,184 and other harms to 
businesses having nothing to do with copyright.185 
All in all, Campbell ought to be read to exclude certain market effects 
as irrelevant: those that are not truly potential, and those that are not 
copyright-relevant. This boundary line comports with copyright law and 
policy by allowing third parties to use copyrighted works in ways that 
copyright law does not seek to protect and in ways that are unlikely to 
harm the copyright owner in the market. Allowing these uses does not 
178. Id. at 116 n.7. 
179. Id. 
180. See Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1046, 1050–51 (2d 
Cir. 1983). 
181. Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 521 (7th Cir. 2002) (observing in a copyright 
infringement suit by the makers of Beanie Babies against the publisher of Beanie Babies collector 
guides: “Given that Ty can license (in fact has licensed) the publication of collectors’ guides that 
contain photos of all the Beanie Babies, how could a competitor forbidden to publish photos of the 
complete line compete? And if it couldn’t compete, the result would be to deliver into Ty’s hands a 
monopoly of Beanie Baby collectors’ guides even though Ty acknowledges that such guides are not 
derivative works and do not become such by being licensed by it.”). 
182. See supra text accompanying notes 173–175 (discussing this exclusion in the context of 
Campbell). 
183. See id. 
184. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1514–17 (9th Cir. 1992). 
185. See supra text accompanying notes 176–181. 
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interfere with copyright owners’ plausible incentives to create 
copyrightable works and also benefits society by making further works 
available to them. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, when Campbell was decided twenty-one years ago it 
set the stage for a more robust fair use framework. It offered up, albeit 
tersely, key ingredients for a robust and defensible consideration of the 
market effects bearing on fair use: a full-bodied consideration of the 
market effects a use inflicts on a copyrighted work—both the market 
harms and benefits—but an exclusion of any effects that are neither 
plausibly potential nor copyright-relevant. With this framework, courts 
can move to evaluate the fourth fair use factor on its own terms, as an 
evidentiary-laden analysis of the effects a use has on a copyright 
holder’s market. 
In this way, fair use evaluations can help copyright law strike a proper 
balance between incentives to initial creators and access and subsequent 
creation by the public and later creators. It does so in a number of ways. 
First, this analysis emphasizes that market benefits should be taken into 
account alongside market harms in assessing market effects bearing on 
fair use. Otherwise, infringement—and no fair use—can be found too 
readily, even in cases in which copyright owners benefit from a third 
party’s use of protected works. Second, this analytical framework 
underscores that copyright law will protect rights-holders only from 
plausible harms to them in the marketplace from copying of their works. 
Harms that are not plausible are unlikely to affect creators’ incentives to 
create and ought to be irrelevant from consideration. Finally, harms that 
a copyright owner experiences in the marketplace that are unrelated 
either to a defendant’s use of protected aspects of a copyrighted work or 
that cause harm to the owner in ways other than to its copyright ought to 
be irrelevant in considering the market effects bearing on fair use. These 
rules help protect both copyright incentives to create and subsequent 
creations, all to the overall benefit of society. 
 
 
